An XRP Ledger contributor has proposed hybrid post-quantum testing in 2027 and a mainnet transition in 2028, although no published XRPL roadmap has confirmed either deadline.
Summary
- An XRPL Foundation contributor has proposed 2027 hybrid testing and a 2028 mainnet transition target.
- No official XRPL roadmap currently confirms the contributor’s proposed 2028 quantum-readiness deadline for mainnet deployment.
- XRPL currently supports secp256k1 and Ed25519 signatures, both exposed to sufficiently capable quantum computers someday.
- Existing RegularKey functionality allows XRPL accounts to change signing keys while retaining their public addresses.
- Ethereum researcher Justin Drake expects Ethereum’s three cryptographic layers to become post-quantum secure by 2029.
Vet, an XRP Ledger Foundation contributor and validator on the decentralized Unique Node List, presented the dates in a Sept. 9 post on X. The contributor described an expected testing phase followed by a hybrid system in which conventional and quantum-resistant signatures would operate together.
The proposed timetable would place an XRPL quantum upgrade one year before the 2029 completion date discussed by Ethereum researcher Justin Drake. Neither date represents a guaranteed network activation. Ethereum’s schedule comes from a researcher’s technical presentation, while XRPL’s dates have not appeared in a formal amendment, specification, validator vote or official roadmap.
XRP Ledger’s 2028 target remains a contributor proposal
Vet said developers expect major progress in 2027 before a possible mainnet transition during 2028. The proposed work would include testing post-quantum algorithms and running new signature methods beside XRPL’s existing cryptography.
Public materials on the official XRP Ledger website do not currently identify 2028 as an approved deadline. No corresponding amendment proposal, technical specification or implementation schedule was located in XRPL’s published documentation as of Sept. 10.
The distinction leaves the dates as a contributor’s reported expectation. XRPL changes normally move through public development, testing and amendment voting before activation. A post on X cannot activate protocol code or commit participating validators to a deployment date.
Vet referred to a proposed emergency mechanism as a “Quantum-Day” response. Under the description, vulnerable accounts could be isolated and placed into a protected state without stopping the ledger. Public XRPL documentation reviewed for this report does not contain an approved amendment bearing that name.
No technical specification currently explains its activation conditions, account restrictions or recovery process. Until developers publish those details, the proposed emergency mechanism remains an attributed concept instead of a confirmed XRPL feature.
Existing key rotation does not complete quantum migration
The XRP Ledger currently recognizes two signing algorithms: secp256k1, based on the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm, and Ed25519, which uses the Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm. Both appear in the ledger’s cryptographic key documentation.
XRPL’s documentation acknowledges that a sufficiently capable quantum computer using Shor’s algorithm could threaten its existing signature methods. The same page says developers could introduce another signing algorithm if practical quantum computers emerge. It does not name a chosen post-quantum algorithm or provide a deployment date.
A built-in RegularKey mechanism already lets an account assign a replacement signing key without changing its public address. The account may later replace or remove the RegularKey by submitting an authorized transaction, as explained in XRPL’s key-management tutorial.
RegularKey rotation is not the same as complete quantum protection. An XRPL account retains a master key derived from its original credentials, and the protocol permits users to disable that master key but not replace it. A complete migration would need to address master keys, multisignature lists, transaction verification, validator operations and any publicly exposed keys vulnerable to future attacks.
Vet said preserving existing r-addresses would reduce disruption for users and custodians. Public documentation confirms that assigning a RegularKey leaves the account address unchanged. It does not confirm that the same mechanism alone can provide a network-wide post-quantum transition.
Ethereum’s 2029 date covers three technical layers
The comparison with Ethereum comes from Justin Drake’s published quantum plan. Drake identified three areas requiring new cryptography: BLS signatures in consensus, KZG commitments for data and ECDSA signatures used by Ethereum accounts.
“My completion date for Ethereum being fully post-quantum secure is 2029,” Drake said. He described the year as his expected completion point, not a binding activation date approved through Ethereum governance.
Ethereum’s work involves different algorithms and protocol components from XRPL. A calendar comparison therefore does not establish which network has completed more engineering, testing or security review. No common technical benchmark cited by either project currently measures their relative readiness.
Drake placed his personal estimate for “Q-Day,” when quantum computers could break existing public-key cryptography, in 2032. Researchers have not established a verified date for such a machine. Hardware progress, error correction and the resources required to attack a deployed blockchain key remain uncertain.
An XRPL quantum upgrade would require validator support
Before a protocol change can become active, XRPL validators must support an amendment continuously above the required threshold. The network’s amendment process generally requires more than 80% backing from trusted validators for two weeks.
A recent upgrade demonstrated how the process can delay activation. As crypto.news reported, XRPL’s corrected BatchV1_1 amendment received 24 votes from 35 dUNL validators on Sept. 8. Its 68.57% support remained below the activation threshold, so the two-week countdown could not begin.
A quantum-related change would first require developers to publish code and define the supported signature scheme. Testing would need to examine transaction size, verification speed, validator performance, hardware-wallet compatibility and account recovery procedures. Validators could then decide whether to enable the amendment.
An algorithm has not been identified in the contributor’s public outline. The available candidates carry different operational costs. Larger public keys and signatures can raise storage, bandwidth and processing requirements, while implementation errors can weaken an otherwise secure cryptographic design.
Standardized algorithms provide several possible paths
The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology published its first completed post-quantum standards in 2024. They include ML-KEM for key establishment, ML-DSA for digital signatures and SLH-DSA as a hash-based signature standard.
XRPL would require a digital-signature method because users sign transactions and validators verify authorization. Selecting a standardized algorithm would still require network-specific engineering, independent audits and compatibility testing.
Project Eleven maintains a post-quantum cryptography registry covering schemes such as ML-DSA, SLH-DSA and FN-DSA, the standardized form related to Falcon. Its public website offers post-quantum audits and testing tools, but no public announcement reviewed for this report confirms an XRPL engagement or a completed security audit.
